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8
Local Responses to Performance 
Incentives and Implications 
for Program Outcomes
Carolyn J. Heinrich
In his classic piece on “street-level” bureaucracy, Lipsky (1980) 
describes the critical position occupied by public employees engaged 
in social service delivery. These employees, he argues, constitute the 
scope and function of government services, and the individual deci-
sions of these workers become agency policy. Street-level bureaucrats 
shape citizens’ expectations of government services, determine who 
qualifi es for services, and implement service delivery. 
This chapter presents research that explores how local (street-level) 
bureaucrats in the JTPA program shaped or moderated the role and 
effects of performance standards in program administration and service 
delivery. A case-study approach is used to investigate these effects in a 
county-level agency (located in the Chicago metropolitan area), using 
data on subunits (contractors) and their staff and individual participants. 
The local JTPA participant selection and service assignment processes 
are modeled using quantitative and qualitative data to facilitate a more 
precise understanding of how and the extent to which performance stan-
dards and related administrative policies infl uence participant access to 
training and the types of services provided to participants. 
Although WIA superseded the JTPA program, the WIA program 
preserves major elements of the JTPA performance standards system 
and extends its role in managing local program processes and service 
delivery. WIA requires states to institute a performance-based certi-
fi cation system for training service providers that establishes a mini-
mum performance level for all providers receiving individual training 
account (voucher) dollars. Local workforce investment boards and ser-
vice providers continue to be responsible for guiding service and fund-
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ing allocations, performance data collection, and the management and 
use of this information at the local level. 
In this research, unique access to information from and about the 
job training agency’s program administration, service providers, and the 
terms of their contracts with the agency facilitated the in-depth study of 
local JTPA program processes. Detailed information on individual par-
ticipants from management information system (MIS) records (1984–
1994) and detailed case management records maintained by staff also 
make possible the analysis of factors that are sometimes overlooked or 
obscured in aggregate (e.g., state-level) studies of program operations. 
 The fi ndings of this research show that program administrators 
and service provider staff in this agency were highly conscious of the 
agency’s performance goals. A contractual and administrative focus on 
specifi c levels of (or standards for) performance outcomes had direct 
and indirect effects on participant selection and training service assign-
ment decisions of program staff. Both deliberate screening on applicant 
characteristics to advance performance goals and indirect cream skim-
ming grounded in contractual arrangements and program administra-
tive decisions appeared to occur in this agency, with possible negative 
implications for the participants and net value added of the program. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows. 
First, local-level administrative and service delivery processes and con-
cerns about the role and infl uence of performance standards in these 
processes are described. The goals of the case study of participant 
selection and service assignments and hypotheses that were tested in 
a simulation of these processes are then explained. The next section 
presents the fi ndings of the simulation and other multivariate analyses, 
as well as a discussion of these fi ndings. The fi nal section summarizes 
the fi ndings and their implications for current employment and training 
programs and policies.
Role of Performance Standards in Local-Level Program 
Administration and Service Delivery 
The substantial discretion accorded to local-level program adminis-
trators in deciding how performance standards are used and the extent 
to which they are used has confounded efforts to fully understand their 
infl uence and implications. The design and institution of performance 
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standards systems varies not only across states but also at the local 
level, where the main responsibility for making these systems func-
tion effectively lies. Along with their own target population and ser-
vice goals, job training agencies transmit federal- and state-level goals 
and requirements to training professionals who serve clients and man-
age job training programs on a daily basis. As both Lipsky (1980) and 
Brodkin (1987) have pointed out, bureaucratic discretion of this type 
provides the means for administrative agencies and program managers 
to make policy by shaping it as they implement it. 
The county job training agency in this study relied primarily on 
contracts with other public and private sector organizations to deliver 
program services.1 Service providers acted, in effect, as agents of the 
administrative entity and entered into a competitive bidding process 
to obtain contracts with the agency for service provision. Through the 
contract awards and negotiation processes, job training agency offi -
cials attempted to exert control over who received services, the types of 
training services made available, and program outcomes. 
Federal and state governments generally specifi ed few guidelines or 
requirements for contracts between agencies and their service provid-
ers. Yet one would expect job training agencies to design contracts that 
facilitate satisfactory job training program outcomes as measured by 
state performance evaluation models. Contracts between this agency 
and its service providers contained detailed information about target 
population demographic characteristics; the types of training to be 
made available and anticipated wages-at-placement, estimated service 
costs, including tuition, wage subsidies, and supportive service costs; 
and performance-based payment benchmarks for reimbursement of pro-
gram costs. Service providers were also required to establish detailed 
program budgets and service plans before contracts were fi nalized, and 
any subsequent modifi cations to the contracts had to be approved and 
documented by agency offi cials.
 In the contract awards process, the largest weights were accorded to 
service providers’ proposed placement rates, costs per placement, and 
average wage rates at placement. Secondary criteria used in this process 
included service provider experience with targeted population(s), labor 
market need for proposed services, private sector linkages and coordi-
nation with other agencies, and service provider in-kind contributions. 
Service providers’ performance in the previous year also factored into 
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the decision process. Service providers who attained at least 90 percent 
of their planned goals for enrollment, job placements, and expenditures 
were eligible for exemplary service points that increased their competi-
tive point totals. 
If, in fact, service providers who satisfi ed or exceeded contract 
requirements—ostensibly furthering the performance and target pop-
ulation goals of the job training agency—were more likely to secure 
future contracts, the system would likely establish strong incentives for 
service providers to achieve high placement rates and wages at place-
ment. Some research, discussed below, suggests that this type of per-
formance evaluation system is also likely to contribute to unintended, 
negative program effects.
Arguments and Evidence on the Role and Infl uence of 
Performance Standards in JTPA Programs 
Two fundamental issues underlie concerns about the infl uence of 
performance standards on employment and training programs: 1) who 
should have access to these services, and 2) what types of program 
services should be provided to achieve program goals. JTPA program 
eligibility guidelines required 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvan-
taged; an equitable distribution of services among substantial segments 
of the eligible population; and minimum levels of service to youth, high 
school dropouts, and welfare recipients. WIA, however, has introduced 
a new universal access approach to service delivery in which all adults 
are eligible for core workforce development services, although local 
workforce investment boards are still encouraged to give priority for 
skills training services to public aid recipients and other low-income 
persons when program funds are sparse. A universal access approach to 
service does not eliminate the possibility that access to varying levels of 
service might still be constrained locally. 
A primary concern expressed by JTPA program administrators was 
that performance standards might encourage cream skimming, or the 
selection of participants who are expected to have good postprogram 
outcomes, regardless of what the program contributes. In cases where 
participants would do nearly as well or equally well in the labor mar-
ket without receiving program services, the program’s measured per-
formance would be high, but its net impact would be small or zero. (In 
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Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith defi ne and discuss the cream skimming 
problem more extensively.)
Research on JTPA operations has generated mixed fi ndings on the 
infl uence of performance standards, depending on the types of perfor-
mance standards used and the local-level practices adopted. In a review 
of this research, Heinrich (1999) notes the general fi nding that state and 
local agencies with policies that emphasized exceeding performance 
standards while minimizing training costs tended to discourage services 
to hard-to-serve eligible applicants and reduced the intensity and aver-
age length of services for adults. Changes in the legislated performance 
standards requirements in 1988 were designed to deemphasize the role 
of performance standards in federal and state JTPA program evaluations 
and to encourage agencies to focus more on providing higher-quality 
training as measured by earnings and employment retention rather than 
job placement rates.2 
From the program administrator’s point of view, there was little 
effect of these legislated changes on service provider performance 
incentives. The system still focused on employment and earnings levels 
rather than gains or net value added of training programs. In the case-
study agency, cost-per-placement standards were still included in 
contracts and were one of the primary criteria for evaluating service 
provider performance in contract award decisions. The 1988 legisla-
tive amendments that changed the evaluation of placement and earn-
ings outcomes to three months after termination did not affect retention 
measures in this agency’s contracts until the 1992 program year. Even 
then, the changes affected less than one-fourth of the contracts. This 
suggests that it is important to know what incentives went into contracts 
between job training agencies and their services providers and were 
used to guide competition among service providers. The fi ndings also 
suggest that despite legislative changes, incentives to “cream-skim” 
may still have been present at the local level.
Because one does not observe participant outcomes in the counter-
factual state (in the absence of program services), it is diffi cult to deter-
mine if intake staff participant selection decisions are unduly infl uenced 
by applicants’ probable labor market success. Most research focuses 
on direct cream skimming by intake staff, or cream skimming based 
on their observations of applicant characteristics during the participant 
selection process. For example, one intake worker observed in this study 
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described an applicant who was laid off from a high-wage, high-skilled 
job and was hoping to be called back to this position. Anticipating an 
easy job placement, the worker enrolled the applicant and assigned him 
to job search assistance activities. When the participant was called back 
to his previous job, the service provider received credit for this place-
ment. This is a relatively obvious case of cream skimming. 
Cream skimming may also operate indirectly, however, through 
practices that may be more diffi cult to identify. Program managers may 
infl uence participant mix indirectly by offering certain types of training 
services that may or may not appeal to specifi c applicant groups. They 
may also establish intake and assessment procedures that favor one 
type of applicant over another. JTPA’s restrictions on stipends and sup-
portive services and the capabilities or willingness of service providers 
to make supportive services available, for example, may have infl u-
enced who applied and the level of motivation they needed to secure 
an opportunity to participate. In addition, the location of service offi ces 
and focus of outreach activities may also affect program awareness and 
the resulting applicant pool. 
In this research, I distinguish between indirect cream skimming, 
which typically infl uences who is likely to apply for services and who 
is likely to follow through the application process (i.e., decisions made 
by the eligible persons), and direct cream skimming, which, alterna-
tively, results from decisions made by intake staff based on their obser-
vations of and interactions with applicants during the selection process. 
I hypothesize that incentives created by JTPA performance standards 
(and continuing under WIA) likely encouraged a combination of direct 
cream skimming on participant characteristics and indirect cream skim-
ming that was grounded in program administrative decisions and con-
tractual arrangements at the local level. 
CASE STUDY AND SIMULATION OF JTPA PARTICIPANT 
SELECTION AND SERVICE ASSIGNMENT PROCESSES
While JTPA legislation, state- and local-level program priorities, 
and terms of contracts between job training agencies and service pro-
viders all provided guidelines for participant selection and service 
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assignment, these decisions were typically made by the agency’s job 
training professionals or service provider staff under contract with the 
agency. A goal of this case study was to uncover the underlying struc-
ture of these judgments, model the participant selection and service 
assignment processes, and evaluate their implications for employment 
and training outcomes.
A number of different factors might infl uence the judgments of 
agency and service provider staff in participant selection and service 
assignment decisions, including external infl uences such as agency 
or contract target population goals, training service and expenditures 
plans, eligibility requirements, and application procedures. Judgments 
of intake staff would also be based on their own knowledge, experi-
ence, and preferences, and the observed or measured characteristics 
of the applicants. Controls for these factors are necessary to evaluate 
their relative infl uences in participant selection and service assignment 
processes. 
This study makes use of detailed information from applicants to a 
job training program at all stages of the participant selection process. 
Participant selection and service assignment decision-making processes 
were observed, intake staff were interviewed about these decision pro-
cesses, and fi nal outcomes (i.e., intake staff judgments) were recorded. 
These observations aided the formulation of hypotheses about these 
processes. Next, an empirical strategy was developed to assess how dif-
ferent factors interact to produce the fi nal decision outcomes.
Case-Study and Simulation Goals, Methodology, and Hypotheses
In studying the structural components of human judgments, 
Rossi and Nock (1982) note that there are a relatively small number of 
characteristics to which decision makers pay attention when making 
judgments about persons. In other words, only a small number of char-
acteristics of the seemingly infi nite number of ways in which job train-
ing program applicants may differ are actually important to the judg-
ments at hand. Second, they argue that, for the most part, judgments are 
“socially structured,” i.e., there is general agreement among persons 
on how much weight should be given to relevant characteristics and on 
how these characteristics should be combined to arrive at judgments. 
A third structural component of human judgments is that each decision 
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maker tends toward consistency in his or her own judgments, departing 
in a regular way from the socially defi ned consensus on how such judg-
ments should be made. If these structural components exist for a spe-
cifi c set of judgments, then the judgments can be modeled to determine 
what variables or characteristics are most relevant to the judgment, as 
well as the nature of their infl uence.
Using detailed data on intake staff decisions, I formulate an 
approach to evaluate the infl uences of external factors and applicant 
characteristics that used both “constructed” and actual program data. 
First, based on observations of participant selection and service assign-
ment decisions and discussions with intake staff, I generate a list of fac-
tors examined by intake staff in these decision-making processes. Using 
actual data collected by program staff on these factors, I construct a 
simulation exercise of these processes. The exercise consisted of four 
main parts: 1) the selection of job training program participants from a 
pool of applicants constructed using actual program data; 2) the assign-
ment of the selected “participants” to training activities; 3) the consid-
eration of alternative scenarios of constraints on participant selection 
decisions, including different levels of performance standards and cost 
constraints; and 4) a review and open group discussion of the casework-
ers’ selection decisions, which included case comparisons chosen to 
probe the infl uences of external factors and applicant characteristics on 
their decisions. (See Heinrich [1995] for a detailed description of the 
simulation exercise design as well as a transcription of the postsimula-
tion discussion.)
I subsequently analyze a number of hypotheses using these data. 
First, are there a relatively small number of observed applicant charac-
teristics which emerge as important in intake staff selection decisions? 
What are these characteristics? The relative importance of character-
istics associated with applicants’ employability or their probability of 
placement was of particular interest, as they relate to analyses of cream 
skimming. Using information known about the actual placement out-
comes of program applicants, I also evaluate the infl uence of appli-
cants’ probability of placement on intake staff selection decisions. 
A second set of hypotheses posed the following questions: Do 
intake staff use the same decision function in selecting participants (as 
other staff members), and do they make the same participant selections? 
Another hypothesis pertains to the third structural component of human 
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judgments: Are intake staff selection decisions consistent, i.e., do they 
depart in a regular way from the socially defi ned consensus? The intake 
staff’s actual selections of participants for the job training program 
were compared to their simulation selections to evaluate consistency.
The simulation was designed to hold constant or eliminate con-
straints on decision making that may infl uence intake staff’s actual 
selection decisions. For example, in the simulation, intake staff were 
given explicit verbal and written instructions that they should assume 
no restrictions on the availability of training service activities. After 
making participant selections, intake staff assigned the selected cases 
to training service activities based on applicant characteristics. I subse-
quently analyzed the relationship of observed applicant characteristics 
to their assignment to different training service activities.
Intake staff were also provided with a target job placement rate and 
approximate cost per participant that refl ected job training center con-
tract averages of these performance standards for optional use in the 
simulation. I use responses of intake staff to a questionnaire admin-
istered during the exercise and postsimulation discussion to uncover 
information about the infl uence of these performance standards during 
the simulation and in practice and their interaction with training ser-
vices constraints in actual job training programs. 
Two professional job training program caseworkers who were 
employees of a job training service provider under contract with the 
agency participated in the simulation.3 These caseworkers were exclu-
sively responsible for selecting program participants and assigning 
them to program activities for the job training program studied. Agency 
offi cials and program caseworkers provided copies of all records of 
applicants to the program, including caseworkers’ comments written 
during case reviews and following meetings with program applicants. 
Caseworkers’ participant selection and service assignment procedures 
were also observed. While it might have been useful to conduct the 
simulation with many intake staff across the job training center, com-
plete access to other applicant records and observations of intake staff 
were not possible, so that similar hypothesis testing and data analyses 
would not have been feasible. 
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Description of JTPA Participant Selection and Service 
Assignment Processes
Similar to many job training agencies under JTPA, the number of 
applicants eligible for program services in this service delivery area 
tended to substantially exceed the number of program openings. There 
were 221 applicants to the specifi c job training program studied, and 50 
of these persons were eventually selected to participate. In screening 
applicants for the program, intake staff met with them an average of 
four times before they made a decision to either enroll them or to refer 
them to another organization for services.
All intake staff in Illinois were required to screen applicants for 
employment barriers, including basic skills defi ciencies, limited work 
histories, single head of household with dependent children, displaced 
homemaker, child care needs, limited English profi ciency, handicapped, 
veteran, ex-offender, and substance abuse. Caseworkers conveyed the 
importance of identifying applicants’ employment barriers and deter-
mining whether they could be overcome with the commitment of the 
applicant and the resources of the program. 
Caseworkers indicated that they viewed the presence of employment 
barriers as an opportunity to serve persons who have a greater need for 
program services. Employment barriers that emerged as positive selec-
tion criteria included basic skills defi ciencies, minimal work histories, 
single head of household, and the presence of children in a household. 
Persons with employment barriers that could not be addressed with pro-
gram resources, such as serious medical or mental health conditions, 
were referred to other agencies for assistance. In addition, caseworkers 
did not view the receipt of public assistance as an employment barrier, 
noting that since the stipend provided under CETA was eliminated in 
JTPA, the receipt of public aid may have provided an essential source 
of income for some participants during their enrollment. 
Caseworkers also evaluated applicants’ levels of motivation and 
commitment to making the program work. While the average number 
of times applicants met with caseworkers was four, case records of pro-
gram applicants showed a range of as few as one meeting to as many as 
eight scheduled appointments over four to six weeks. Applicants were 
typically required to come back for at least one additional meeting; 
those who did not return again were assumed to be less serious about 
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participating. If the applicants kept their appointments, were punctual, 
and came prepared, caseworkers interpreted these as signs that they 
were capable and willing to make a serious program commitment. In 
effect, caseworkers attempted to distinguish between those people who 
were only interested in a “quick fi x” (i.e., looking for the shortest way 
to get money in their hands) and those who had a serious interest in 
increasing their skills and fi nding employment. 
The types of information caseworkers sought from applicants also 
aided their efforts to assess the applicants’ ability or willingness to com-
mit to the program. In evaluating employment histories, caseworkers 
not only sought basic information about employment status, job posi-
tions, and recent wages, but they also wanted to know how long appli-
cants stayed with their jobs, the reasons they were no longer at the jobs, 
and whether absenteeism was ever a problem. They wanted to know 
the types of occupational or job training activities received in order 
to avoid duplication or to build upon previously acquired skills. They 
asked whether the training was completed, if the applicant obtained a 
job after training, and how long the individual then stayed with the 
job. If there were gaps in an applicant’s employment history, the case-
workers wanted to fi nd out if there were reasonable explanations for 
them, such as pregnancy, health problems, or family responsibilities. As 
with employment barriers, their concern was not necessarily how many 
problems there were, but rather how much effort the applicant was will-
ing to put forth to overcome these diffi culties.
Caseworkers claimed that they were less likely to select individu-
als with post–high school educations, since they believed they could 
do more to serve persons with relatively less education. Their ability 
to effectively serve the less educated, however, was also contingent on 
contract specifi cations for training service availability. Caseworkers 
indicated in the simulation questionnaire that the types of training ser-
vices and available training “slots” were determined long before their 
initial screening sessions with applicants. In fact, the types of train-
ing services and corresponding number of training opportunities were 
typically set before the fi nal approval of program funding in the JTPA 
program. The program director then told the caseworkers how many 
vocational training, on-the-job training (OJT), and other positions could 
be made available to participants. “[The program director] will tell us 
something like ‘we have fi ve slots for OJT, and we want to fi ll them 
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with $8.00 per hour positions,” explained one caseworker. Casework-
ers could make a request to modify the original training service plan, 
but this was usually not done. The service assignment process actu-
ally began, therefore, when the caseworkers commenced the applicant 
screening process.
Caseworkers also frequently arranged specifi c training opportuni-
ties (e.g., a particular apprenticeship position in a manufacturing plant), 
and then looked for applicants who met the position requirements. In 
effect, they would fi rst “fi ll the training slots” with appropriate posi-
tions to satisfy the service provider contract and then screen for appli-
cants who were suitable to these positions. The responses of 110 JTPA 
applicants to follow-up survey questions about their screening sessions 
with intake staff also provided evidence of this practice. About 20 per-
cent of the applicants discussed specifi c training opportunities and jobs 
with intake staff. Several were even set up for interviews and offered 
jobs before they began intake procedures or before they were notifi ed 
of the staff’s decision to either accept them into the program or refer 
them elsewhere. One respondent indicated that she was offered a job 
during the application process and was worried that if that particular job 
closed, she might not be accepted into the program.
Performance standards in service providers’ contracts with the 
agency may also have infl uenced the training opportunities made avail-
able and fi nal participant selections. In the simulation, caseworkers 
were given a target job placement rate and an approximate cost per 
placement to guide their decisions if they chose to use this information. 
The caseworkers indicated in the postsimulation questionnaire, how-
ever, that this information did not have any infl uence on their partici-
pant selection and service assignment decisions. They pointed out that 
their objective was to “place” the participants, not to worry about costs. 
“I work with the person, not the money,” wrote one caseworker. 
During a meeting with agency offi cials prior to the start of the pro-
gram, one of the caseworkers had made the comment that it was dif-
fi cult to get “numbers” out of his mind, that he was thinking “numbers, 
numbers, numbers.” When asked about his comment in the open dis-
cussion, this caseworker indicated that it was the job placement rate 
number that concerned him. He clarifi ed that the placement rate affects 
whether or not his organization will get comparable funding in the next 
program year. The director who supervises the caseworkers’ work also 
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indicated that the job placement rate achieved by the program would 
be a key factor in agency’s evaluation of the service provider’s perfor-
mance. On the other hand, caseworkers also emphasized the separation 
of day-to-day operations “in the fi eld” and issues of the budget that are 
the director’s concern: “ . . . we’re not dealing directly with the budget. 
We are the implementers of the program.”
The fi ndings of an interview conducted with the agency’s intake 
supervisor supported the caseworkers’ assertion about the role and 
infl uence of performance standards (see Heinrich [1995] for the inter-
view transcription). The intake supervisor indicated that participants 
were selected on the basis of the professional judgment of intake staff, 
and that the performance standards played no direct role in their deci-
sions. Yet the intake supervisor also indicated that intake staff had little 
discretion in deciding what types of training services they could make 
available to clients. She said they were given strict, detailed guidelines 
to which they were expected to closely adhere in assigning participants 
to activities. This fi nding is consistent with the caseworkers’ responses 
indicating they did not have a role in determining the availability and 
number of training service openings. These decisions were made by the 
program director in consideration of contract requirements and budget 
specifi cations negotiated with agency offi cials. Together, these fi ndings 
suggest that the infl uence of performance standards in the participant 
selection and service assignment processes may have been more likely 
to operate indirectly, at the administrative or executive level, through 
decisions made about service availability by program directors and 
agency executives. The reported separation of performance standards 
considerations from intake staff duties appears to refute contentions 
that performance standards lead to direct cream skimming based on 
applicant characteristics at the caseworker level.
SIMULATION FINDINGS: JTPA PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
AND SERVICE ASSIGNMENTS
Figure 8.1 shows how simulated data were analyzed to evaluate 
the infl uence of various factors on participant selection and service 
assignment decisions. The columns show the decision of caseworker 
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1 (e.g., choose or do not choose applicant), and the rows refl ect the 
same decision of caseworker 2. Also shown are the four possible out-
comes of caseworkers’ decisions for a given applicant: both select the 
applicant, neither selects the applicant, caseworker 1 selects the appli-
cant but caseworker 2 does not, and caseworker 2 chooses the applicant 
but caseworker 1 does not. The simulation data for all applicants were 
aggregated to form the following variables for analyses: 1) applicants 
selected by caseworker 1 (column 1 in the box); 2) applicants selected 
by caseworker 2 (row 1 in the box); 3) applicants selected by either 
caseworker 1 or caseworker 2 (upper right-hand cell, upper left-hand 
cell and lower left-hand cell); and 4) the selection decisions of case-
worker 1 plus those of caseworker 2 (all four cells in the box), which 
factors in their decisions not to choose applicants as well. The fourth 
decision variable is used only in logit analyses of the simulation data. 
Comparison of Simulation Selections and Actual 
Program Selections
Simple comparisons of the caseworkers’ simulation and actual pro-
gram selections (e.g., chi-square tests) suggested that the two casework-
ers selected similar groups of participants and that they were generally 
consistent in their decision-making procedures. Twelve of the 25 cases 
selected by the caseworkers in the simulation (48 percent) were the 
same. However, these comparisons do not provide information about 
which applicant characteristics they emphasized in their selection deci-
sions, how much weight was given to these characteristics, or how dif-
ferent characteristics might have interacted to infl uence their selection 
decisions. To learn more about caseworkers’ decision functions and 
Figure 8.1  Analysis of Counselors’ Simulated Selection Decisions
Counselor 1 selections
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how they arrived at fi nal selections, maximum likelihood logit models 
of their participant selections were estimated.
Logit models were used to estimate factors infl uencing participant 
selections.4 Four of the dependent variables employed in the logit analy-
ses were described in Figure 8.1: 1) the simulated participant selections 
of caseworker 1; 2) the simulated participant selections of caseworker 2; 
3) the simulated selections of either caseworker 1 or caseworker 2; and 
4) selections of caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2, where cases selected by 
neither caseworker have zero “weight.” Cases selected by one but not the 
other are “weighted” by one, and cases selected by both are “weighted” 
by two. Errors in these simulated selection models may represent indi-
vidual errors (e.g., deviations from the caseworkers’ usual judgment 
processes), intrinsic uncertainty (e.g., refl ecting that the caseworkers’ 
judgments may naturally vary or not always be 100 percent consistent), 
and other possible decision errors. 
The fi fth dependent variable indicates which of the 50 applicant 
cases included in the simulation were actual program participants and 
was used to model the infl uence of applicant characteristics on case-
workers’ actual participant selections. The error term in this model may 
refl ect the infl uence of omitted variables (e.g., factors which casework-
ers considered but were not incorporated in the simulation), such as the 
reasons applicants left their previous jobs. This type of information was 
not available for all applicants and therefore was not provided to case-
workers in the simulation.
A large number of possible explanatory variables was reduced 
through the modeling process to a core set of independent variables, 
including age, sex (male), single head of household, highest grade 
completed, previous training services, never married, welfare recipi-
ent, number of children, basic skills defi ciency, limited work history, 
unemployed all of preprogram year, and most recent wage. All of the 
dependent and independent variables employed in the logit analyses are 
described in Appendix 8A. 
The logistic regression model results for the fi ve dependent vari-
ables are summarized in Table 8.1. The fi ndings suggest that casework-
ers emphasize different factors in their selection decisions, and the 
coeffi cient sizes and signs on many variables suggest that they weighed 
these factors differently as well. Four of the explanatory variables in 
the model of caseworker 2’s selections attained statistical signifi cance, 
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NOTE: * signifi cant at α = 0.100; ** signifi cant at α = 0.050; *** signifi cant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coeffi cient values.
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compared to only one independent variable in the model of caseworker 
1’s selections. Caseworker 2 was the older and more experienced intake 
staff member. It is possible that as intake staff gain more experience 
in this profession, they become more certain about which applicant 
characteristics are important and/or more consistent in their decision-
making procedures.
A formal test of the hypothesis that the caseworkers employed the 
same decision function, a test for equality of the coeffi cients in the 
selection models, was performed.5 The results of the likelihood ratio 
test rejected the null hypothesis (at α < 0.005) that the caseworkers’ 
decision functions were the same.6 This fi nding suggests that there 
may not be a strong “social structure” or consensus as to how applicant 
characteristics should be evaluated in participant selection processes, 
at least for the characteristics measured and included in these mod-
els. I also calculated pseudo-R2 values for the models (see Amemiya 
1981) and found that when modeled separately, there is considerably 
more unexplained variance in the caseworkers’ simulated selections. 
This seems to suggest that when combining the decisions made by both 
caseworkers and giving more weight to cases in which both agreed to 
either admit or reject applicants, we gain a better understanding of their 
decision-making processes.  
The most consistent fi nding across the models in Table 8.1 was 
the negative coeffi cient on the highest grade completed variable, sta-
tistically signifi cant in three of the fi ve models. This fi nding implies 
that applicants with more education were less likely to be selected into 
the program and is consistent with caseworkers’ indications that they 
favored applicants with lower education levels. 
The two employment barriers mentioned most frequently in case 
reviews and in the postsimulation discussion were basic skills defi cien-
cies and limited work histories. Being the most closely related (of the 
observed characteristics) to applicants’ employability, one would expect 
that if intake staff were cream skimming based on these characteristics, 
they would be negatively related to the probability of selection. The 
coeffi cient for basic skills defi ciency is positive in three models and 
is large and statistically signifi cant in two of these. The limited work 
history variable also has a positive coeffi cient in four models but is not 
statistically signifi cant in any model. These fi ndings provide tentative 
evidence against the theory that intake staff cream-skim on observed 
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characteristics related to employability. Long-term unemployment was 
also a statistically signifi cant, positive selection factor in two models.
The variable coeffi cients in the model of the caseworkers’ actual 
program participant selections, however, differed from those in the 
caseworkers’ simulation models. These differences might be attributed 
to a number of factors, including unobserved and unmeasured factors 
(such as applicant motivation or constraints on training service assign-
ments) and decision errors (including random deviations from their 
usual judgment processes or inconsistencies in their judgments). 
With information about the caseworkers’ actual program partici-
pant selections and the employment outcomes of program applicants, 
I further analyze the infl uence of applicants’ probability of placement 
on participant selection decisions using a two-stage model. In the fi rst-
stage regression (shown in Table 8.2), a variable indicating whether 
or not employment was obtained following program application was 
regressed against applicants’ demographic and employment and train-
ing history characteristics to obtain predicted probabilities of placement 
for the applicants. These predicted placement probabilities formed a 
new variable (the probability of placement) that was used as an explan-
atory variable in a second-stage regression with caseworkers’ actual 
participant selections as the dependent variable (also shown in Table 
8.2). 
A striking fi nding of this second-stage regression is the relatively 
large, positive, and statistically signifi cant coeffi cient on the probability 
of placement variable, more precisely estimated than any other explan-
atory variable in the regression. This fi nding suggests that in the actual 
participant selection process, caseworkers were likely infl uenced by 
factors related to applicants’ probability of placement (or employment). 
It also indicates that direct cream skimming on applicant characteristics 
might have been occurring. 
To further evaluate this argument, I also added the probability of 
placement variable to the caseworkers’ simulated selection models 
and reestimated these logistic regressions (see Table 8.3). In estimat-
ing these models, I sought to test whether the probability of placement 
was some function of the observed applicant characteristics provided 
to caseworkers in the simulation, or a function of additional informa-
tion the caseworkers acquire during the selection process, i.e., infor-
mation not captured in the variables made available in the simulation. 
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Table 8.2  Two-Stage Logistic Regression Estimation of the Infl uence
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NOTE: * signifi cant at α = 0.100; ** signifi cant at α = 0.050; *** signifi cant at α = 0.010. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coeffi cient values.
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The results presented in Table 8.3 indicate that the probability of place-
ment was not a signifi cant factor in the caseworkers’ simulation selec-
tion decisions. There are several possible interpretations of these fi nd-
ings. One is that the caseworkers did evaluate and weigh applicants’ 
observed characteristics to estimate their probability of placement, but 
that in the simulation (free of performance pressures and constraints), 
they did not use this information. A more plausible explanation, how-
ever, is that the probability of placement was judged mainly using 
information not made available in the simulation. For example, some 
of these unmeasured variables might include information that provides 
clues about the applicants’ motivation (from details of employment his-
tory to physical appearance). Although this type of information is not 
systematically collected by employment and training program staff, in 
their actual participant selection decisions, caseworkers seemed to pre-
dict placement probabilities very well and to use this information to 
guide their decisions. 
In his classic study on bureaucracy, Blau (1955) fi nds similar par-
ticipant screening philosophies and practices among state employment 
agency staff. Like the JTPA intake workers, employment agency staff 
who exercised discretion in client selection indicated they derived sat-
isfaction from helping those most in need and “welcomed the opportu-
nity to assist them.” However, in actual client selections, Blau fi nds the 
majority of agency staff favored “strivers,” or persons who were most 
likely to be successful in society. He concluded that personal prefer-
ences for helping the most disadvantaged were set aside as a result of 
the orientation toward maximizing placements and in the interest of 
effi cient performance. Forty years later, Blau’s conclusions seem to gar-
ner support from this case study as well.
Multinomial Logit Analyses of Factors Infl uencing Participant 
Assignment to Training Activities
During the simulation, the caseworkers assigned each person they 
selected to a training service activity. They were given no guidelines as 
to the number of “participants” they could assign to each of four avail-
able program activities (vocational training, on-the-job training, reme-
dial education, and job search assistance). In making these assignments, 
caseworkers were asked to consider only applicant characteristics.
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Table 8.3  Logistic Regressions of Simulated Participant Selections from 










































































NOTE: ** signifi cant at α = 0.050; *** signifi cant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses below the coeffi cient values.
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The multinomial logit analyses examine the factors that infl uenced 
intake staff service assignment decisions. The dependent variables are 
categorical variables for four main types of program activities made 
available in JTPA programs: vocational training, on-the-job training, 
basic or remedial education, and job search assistance. The independent 
variables in these models were the characteristics of the selected par-
ticipants, i.e., the same core set of variables employed in the models of 
participant selection. Table 8.4 shows the multinomial logit estimation 
of participant service assignments using the simulation data. Despite 
the small sample of 38 simulation assignees (only those cases selected 
were assigned to services), there are a number of statistically signifi cant 
fi ndings among these results. 
A multinomial logit regression of service assignment was also esti-
mated for adult JTPA Title IIA program participants in the job training 
agency. The management information system (MIS) data provided by 
the agency for all JTPA program years was used, yielding a total of 
18,120 observations. The dependent variable employed in the job train-
ing center multinomial logit model included assignment to the same 
four categories of training as the simulation model. The independent 
variables were also the same as those available for the simulation mod-
els, with a few exceptions.7 The job training center multinomial logit 
model is shown in Table 8.5. 
One of the more important fi ndings of the multinomial logit mod-
els suggests that access to training opportunities for persons with basic 
skills defi ciencies and low education levels may have been relatively 
limited. High school dropouts and persons with basic skills defi cien-
cies were signifi cantly more likely to be assigned to receive remedial 
education, while persons with more education were signifi cantly less 
likely to receive these services. Persons with basic skills defi ciencies 
were signifi cantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, on-
the-job training, or job search assistance, while persons with post–high 
school educations were signifi cantly more likely to receive job search 
assistance. These fi ndings support the theory that individuals assigned 
to on-the-job training and job search assistance require basic educa-
tion and skill levels that make them more “job-ready.” Discussions 
with the program caseworkers and fi ndings of the National JTPA Study 
also revealed that vocational training providers often have enrollment 
requirements that preclude the entry of persons with basic skills defi -
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Table 8.4  Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Simulation Data 
Independent variables
Categorical dependent variable
Vocational training On-the-job training
Basic or remedial 
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Model log likelihood                       −61.396
NOTE: * signifi cant at α = 0.100; ** signifi cant at α = 0.050; *** signifi cant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coeffi cient values.
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Table 8.5  Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Service Records of 18,120 Adult JTPA 
Title IIA Participants, Program Years 1984–1993
Independent variables
Categorical dependent variable
Vocational training On-the-job training
Basic or remedial 
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Model log likelihood         −20,586.83
NOTE: * signifi cant at α = 0.100; ** signifi cant at α = 0.050; *** signifi cant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coeffi cient values.
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ciencies, e.g., requirements such as a high school diploma or minimum 
scores on tests of adult basic education. 
Another noteworthy fi nding was that males were more likely to be 
assigned to on-the-job training, which has consistently been shown to 
be the most effective employment and training service (Barnow and 
Gubits 2002). During case reviews and the postsimulation discussion, 
the caseworkers pointed out that men tended to be more eager to get 
into training activities that generated a faster monetary payoff. Since 
on-the-job training participants received wages during the training 
period, males found these training opportunities more lucrative. In 
addition, male applicants were more likely to have had previous job 
experience that was expected to aid a successful outcome in on-the-
job training activities. In general, women and welfare recipients were 
more likely to be assigned to vocational training activities, and welfare 
recipients were also signifi cantly less likely to be assigned to on-the-job 
training activities. Also consistent with the above fi ndings, persons with 
limited work histories (i.e., minimal job experience) were signifi cantly 
less likely to be assigned to on-the-job training and job search assis-
tance; they were signifi cantly more likely to receive remedial education 
or vocational training services. 
The coeffi cients for the program year indicators (Table 8.5) show 
a pattern of declining assignment probabilities in the 1990s, most 
likely refl ecting the decline in JTPA program funding and reduced 
number of training opportunities during these years. Studies suggest 
that with fewer resources, job training agencies are more likely to allo-
cate funds to less expensive, shorter-term training activities and to avoid 
serving those who require more intensive services to become job-ready 
(Dickinson and West 1988; Zornitsky et al. 1988; Orfi eld and Slessarev 
1986). Table 8.6 shows that corresponding to funding declines in the 
1990s, there was a noticeable shift in this agency toward less expensive 
services (e.g., job search assistance and job club activities). There was 
also a less defi nitive trend away from the provision of more expensive 
training such as remedial education services, on-the-job training and 
vocational training (with costs per placement ranging from $2,917.90 
to $2,834.10). Job search assistance and job club activities (a less inten-
sive form of job search) were much less expensive services (approxi-
mately $1700). (See Table 8.7 for job placement rates, wages at place-
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Table 8.6  Number of Training Services Received by JTPA Title 2A Adult Participants, Program Years 1986–1993 
JTPA training service activitya
PY 1986 PY 1987 PY 1988 PY 1989 PY 1990 PY 1991 PY 1992 PY 1993







































































































a Supportive services were not shown in this table since the identifi er codes were used inconsistently in the JTPA MIS system.
b For some of the early program years, these data were either not available or were coded inconsistently.
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ment, and estimated service costs for adult JTPA Title IIA participants 
by program activity.)
 In addition, Table 8.6 shows that counseling and assessment activi-
ties were replaced by case management services beginning in program 
year 1992. To generate an offi cial record of the provision of case man-
agement services, program staff had to make contact with a participant 
at least once per month. This minimal case-management requirement 
made these services very inexpensive to provide. In program year 1993, 
23.8 percent of JTPA Title IIA program participants received only case 
management services while enrolled. It is possible that as program 
resources continued to decline, job training agencies found that provid-
ing only case-management services was an inexpensive way to main-
tain participant numbers despite squeezed budgets.
It is also possible that agency offi cials were struggling to manage 
trade-offs among the costs of services, the benefi ts to participants as 
measured by performance standards, and the number of training oppor-
tunities they could make available. The job placement rate was accorded 
the highest weight in this agency’s performance evaluation process. The 
provision of on-the-job training services, which were more costly to 
provide but generated higher average job placement rates (by a margin 
of 21–38 percent) than other training activities, was not declining over 
time. Vocational training, however, had a substantially lower average 
Table 8.7  Job Placement Rates, Wages at Placement, and Estimated 












Vocational training 58.3 5.87 2,834.10
On-the-job training 81.2 6.72 2,844.13
Remedial education services 43.0 5.73 2,917.90
Job search assistance 47.7 6.82 1,789.06
Job club 51.2 6.90 1,642.90
Counseling and assessment 59.9 6.17 2,541.46
Case management 58.4 7.03 n/aa
a For most service provider contracts and participant records, the costs of case manage-
ment activities are not specifi ed separately from other service costs.
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job placement rate (58.3 percent) that is about the same as the place-
ment rate for counseling/case management activities, but is consider-
ably more expensive to provide than counseling and case management. 
In a 1992 review of job training program evaluations, LaLonde fi nds 
that less expensive services provided to a larger segment of the eligible 
population yielded higher returns for each training dollar invested. It 
is also important to remember that costs per placement continued to 
be a primary factor in this agency’s performance reviews and contract 
award decisions long after the federal government eliminated cost-per-
placement standards.  
Synthesis of Findings on Participant Selection, Service 
Assignment, and Program Management
The analyses of participant selection and service assignment 
decisions, in conjunction with the implications of declining program 
resources in this job training agency, suggest that declining program 
funds may have compelled the provision of cheaper training services. 
This, in turn, may have required the recruitment of more job-ready per-
sons to attain successful outcomes (i.e., job placements). For example, 
given budgetary pressures due to declining federal program resources, 
service providers may have been led in competitive bidding and con-
tract negotiations to increase the number of job search assistance (i.e., 
less expensive) positions budgeted for their programs. As intake staff 
typically worked with fi xed numbers of available training positions 
when they began the applicant screening process, they may have been 
required to recruit more individuals suitable to job search assistance 
activities.
One of the most consistent fi ndings in the simulated and actual 
participant selection models was the negative relationship of years of 
schooling completed to the probability of selection. On the other hand, 
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 showed that the number of years of schooling com-
pleted was positively related to assignment to job search assistance 
activities. Therefore, given a specifi c and growing number of job search 
assistance positions they were required to fi ll, intake staff may have 
been induced to select more applicants with higher education levels.
The participant selection models also indicated that applicants with 
basic skills defi ciencies were more likely to be selected, and the ser-
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vice assignment models showed these persons were signifi cantly more 
likely to receive remedial education services. However, remedial edu-
cation was one of the more expensive training activities, and provision 
of these services declined over time under JTPA. Nonprofi t agencies 
(independent of the JTPA program) were likewise under increasing 
performance accountability pressures and less likely to offer remedial 
education on their “menu” of services. As fewer remedial education 
opportunities were made available, it is possible that caseworkers were 
less likely to enroll persons with basic skill defi ciencies. In addition, 
the fi ndings also showed that participants with basic skills defi ciencies 
were signifi cantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, on-
the-job training, and job search assistance, suggesting that more dis-
advantaged participants might not have had access to the full range of 
training services if remedial education services were not made available 
to them. 
Other case study fi ndings generally supported these assertions 
about the effects of budgetary constraints on the availability of training 
opportunities and the selection of program participants. Service pro-
vider managers indicated that contract cost-per-placement standards 
discouraged the provision of multiple services (e.g., remedial education 
followed by vocational training), since these services raised average 
cost per placement fi gures and could negatively affect future contract 
awards. Even though intake staff asserted that they are not infl uenced by 
performance standards, the continued emphasis on placement rates and 
costs per placement in local-level service provider contracts seemed to 
be a pervasive force. A separate study (Heinrich 1999) of this agency’s 
administrative and service provider contracting practices showed that 
service providers’ performance relative to cost standards established in 
their contracts with the local JTPA agency was the most important factor 
infl uencing the agency’s contract renewal and funding level decisions.
In conclusion, the strong emphasis on placement rates and costs 
per placement in the local-level performance evaluation system seemed 
to inevitably pervade intake staff participant selection and service 
assignment decisions, contributing to both direct and indirect creaming 
practices. Other factors affecting program administration and service 
delivery decisions exacerbated the pressures generated by performance 
standards. These factors included declining program resources (relative 
to a large job-training-eligible population), the absence of performance 
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standard adjustments in service provider contracts for services to more 
disadvantaged applicants, and minimum qualifi cations required for 
entry to more intensive skill-building program activities.
CONCLUSION
While the fi ndings of this case study are not generalizable to all 
job training programs, some basic policy conclusions emerge that have 
implications for the administration of current job training programs 
under WIA and other programs (e.g., public welfare). This research pro-
duced evidence that “street-level bureaucrats” engaged in job training 
program service delivery were responsive to incentives generated by the 
performance standards system. The local job training agency designed 
its own performance-based contracting and provider performance eval-
uation system, and program administrators and service provider staff 
demonstrated that they were highly conscious of the agency’s emphasis 
on placement rate and cost-per-placement outcomes. 
The agency’s contractual and administrative focus on placement 
rates and cost-per-placement appeared to have both direct and indirect 
effects on the participant selection and training service assignment deci-
sions of program staff. Both direct cream skimming on applicant char-
acteristics during the participant selection process and indirect cream 
skimming grounded in contractual arrangements and program adminis-
trative decisions were likely occurring in this service delivery area, with 
potentially negative implications for the achievement of basic program 
objectives.
The research fi ndings also suggest that the main sources of indirect 
cream skimming were contractual and administrative constraints on the 
types of training services that could be made available to program par-
ticipants. The study of the JTPA service assignment processes showed 
that participant selection decisions and service assignment decisions 
were most often made concurrently, and that the numbers and types 
of available training positions were typically fi xed before the intake 
process began. Therefore, intake staff were required to fi nd persons 
suitable to the available training positions, rather than selecting partici-
pants based primarily on their relative need for and interest in training 
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services and then assigning them to appropriate activities. This practice 
by itself does not constitute cream skimming. However, as job training 
program funds declined over time, the availability of remedial educa-
tion services decreased substantially, and the provision of relatively 
less-expensive program services, such as job search assistance and job 
club activities, increased. As a result, access to training for persons with 
basic skills defi ciencies and low education levels appears to be declin-
ing, while access for more able, job-ready applicants (better suited to 
job search activities) was likely increasing.  
In the WIA program, concerns have again been raised about the 
infl uence of performance standards on individuals’ access to program 
services. The WIA performance standards, like those in JTPA, still 
focus on shorter-term outcome levels, and budgetary constraints like-
wise limit the types of services that are made available to participants. 
In addition, WIA introduced a sequential process of service access, 
from core (basic and self-directed job search services) to intensive (job 
readiness and job search seminars) to substantive job skills training 
services. While local programs have adapted different approaches to 
sequencing, early studies show that few clients are receiving the more 
expensive intensive or training services (D’Amico et al. 2001). Barnow 
and Gubits (2002) note that in one site, the level of training provided 
under WIA was reduced by 75 percent. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, a 2002 GAO report sug-
gests that history may be repeating itself. The GAO interviewed WIA 
program administrators in 50 states and visited fi ve sites to assess the 
effectiveness of the WIA performance management system and reported 
that many states have indicated that the need to meet performance stan-
dards is a driving factor in who receives WIA-funded services at the 
local level. It also described how some local areas were limiting access 
to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get and 
retain a job. Observing the serious challenges that states and locali-
ties have faced in implementing the system, the GAO suggested that 
“even when fully implemented, WIA performance measures may still 
not provide a true picture of WIA-funded program performance” (GAO 
2002, p. 3). In a summary report to the USDOL on the implementation 
of WIA, Barnow and Gubits (2002, Note 12) also fi nd, based on meet-
ings with offi cials from about 20 states, that “the greatest dissatisfaction 
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in every instance has been with the way the performance management 
system has been implemented.” 
This study presents evidence of strong links between the types 
of services made available in public training programs and who gets 
access to these services, and the role and effects of performance stan-
dards on key decisions made by program administrators and street-level 
bureaucrats in implementing the program. More generally, the collec-
tive empirical fi ndings of this book demonstrate the responsiveness of 
public organizations and their employees to performance standards, and 
suggest that in designing or refi ning performance standards systems for 
public programs, careful consideration should be given to both direct 
and indirect potential consequences of these systems for those served 
or seeking services. 
Notes
 1. While this administrative structure was common to many JTPA service delivery 
areas, WIA now prohibits these local agencies from directly providing training 
services, and the only contract or agreement for service provision that may be 
established (with few exceptions) is between the workforce investment boards and 
One-Stop center operators. The local workforce investment boards are required 
to select One-Stop operators through a competitive process or designation of a 
consortium that includes at least three of the federal programs providing services 
at the One-Stop. 
 2.  The principal 1988 changes included an end to mandatory use of cost-per-
placement standards and a shift toward the evaluation of placement and earnings 
outcomes three months after participant termination rather than at the time of 
termination.
 3. The job training program service provider I closely studied has been operating 
in this job training center since the CETA years (i.e., before JTPA). It is one of 
the primary vendors and has accounted for approximately 7 percent of all service 
provider contracts since the start of JTPA. One of the two program caseworkers 
had approximately 5 years of experience working in this profession, and the other 
was employed as a caseworker for 16 years. Both had worked for this particular 
service provider for about 5 years. 
 4.  The logit model estimated was: Pi = E(Y=1 | Xi) = 1 / 1 + e−(b1 + b2Xi1 +. . . + bk Xik), 
where Pi is the probability an applicant is selected, Y is the program caseworker’s 
decision, taking on the value “1” if a given applicant is selected, and the Xik are 
characteristics of the program applicants. The betas (bk) measure the infl uence of 
applicant characteristics on caseworkers’ judgments. 
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 5.  First, an unrestricted model of the caseworkers’ simulation selections was esti-
mated. This model included two sets of explanatory variables (i.e., the demo-
graphic characteristics and employment and training history variables included 
in the logit models)—one set interacted with caseworker 1’s simulation selections 
and the other interacted with caseworker 2’s selections. This model allowed differ-
ent estimates of the variable coeffi cients for each caseworker. The restricted model 
used the dependent variable “caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2 selections.”
 6. Likelihood ratio statistic = −2 ln λ, where ln λ = ln L(Ωr) − ln L(Ω) = −56.376 − 
−33.492 = −22.884. The observed value of −2 ln λ is very large (45.768). With 11 
degrees of freedom, it is much greater than χ20.005, which leads me to strongly reject 
Ho.
 7. In the job training center multinomial logit model: 1) education is represented by 
indicator variables (high school dropout, post–high school education, and college 
graduate, where the omitted category is high school graduate); 2) household size 
is used as a proxy for the number of children; 3) employment status and history 
are represented by an indicator variable for employment status at application 
(unemployed at application) and variables indicating employment history in the 
year prior to application (no preprogram year earnings, employed–unemployed 
transition, unemployed–employed transition); 4) an indicator variable for race 
(African American) is included in the model; 5) there were no variable measures 
available in the MIS data for marital status or previous training activities, and 6) 
program year indicators are included to capture the infl uence of changes in the 
availability of different training activities across program years.
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Actual participant selections = 1 if actual program participant, 0 if applicant, 
nonparticipant.
Counselor 1 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 1 during the simulation, 0 
if not selected by counselor 1.
Counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 
if not selected by counselor 2.
Counselor 1 or counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by either counselor 1 or 
counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor 1 or 
counselor 2.
Counselor 1 plus counselor 2 selections: based on 100 evaluated exercise cases 
(50 by counselor 1 and 50 by counselor 2) = 1 if selected by either counselor 
1 or counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor 
1 or counselor 2.
Service category = 0 if not selected nor assigned to a training activity, 1 if 
selected case was assigned to vocational training, 2 if selected case was 
assigned to on-the-job training, 3 if selected case was assigned to remedial 
education, and 4 if selected case was assigned to job search assistance.
Wage at placement = JTPA program participants’ wage at placement (i.e., at the 
time of their termination from the program, if placed in a job), in dollars.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Sex = 1 if male, 0 if female.
Age Variables
Age: (continuous, range 19–51).
Age less than 30 years = 1 if under 30 years old, 0 otherwise.
Age 30 to 39 years = 1 if 30 to 39 years old, 0 otherwise.
Age over 39 years = 1 if over 39 years old, 0 otherwise.
269
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Ethnicity
White = 1 if white (Caucasian), 0 otherwise.
African American = 1 if African American, 0 otherwise.
Hispanic = 1 if of Hispanic origin (including South or Central Americans, 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and others), 0 otherwise.
Other race = 1 if American Indian, Asian, or any other race excluded in other 
categories, 0 otherwise.
Education Variables
Highest grade completed: (continuous, range 10–16).
Dropout = 1 if high school dropout, 0 otherwise.
Graduated high school = 1 if high school graduate with no post–high school 
education, 0 otherwise.
Post–high school education = 1 if has post–high school education, 0 otherwise.
Any training = 1 if previously received vocational, on-the-job, or other training 
services, 0 otherwise.
GED = 1 if has GED, 0 otherwise.
Labor Force Status and Employment History Variables
Employed at application = 1 if employed at application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed at application = 1 if unemployed at application, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force at application = 1 if not in labor force, 0 otherwise.
Employed–unemployed transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Employed–not in labor force transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior 
to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 0 
otherwise.
Employed all of preprogram year = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed–employed transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior 
to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed–not in labor force transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months 
prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 
0 otherwise.
Unemployed all of preprogram year = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force–employed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 months 
prior to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
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Not in labor force–unemployed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 
months prior to application and unemployed in 6 months prior to applica-
tion, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force all of preprogram year = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 
months prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to appli-
cation, 0 otherwise.
Ever worked full time = 1 if ever worked full time, 0 otherwise.
Most recent wage: (continuous, range $4.25– $10.40).
Zero earnings in year prior to enrollment = 1 if no earnings in employment 
security records in the four quarters prior to the individual’s enrollment in 
JTPA, 0 otherwise.
Employment Barriers
Single head of household = 1 if single head of household, 0 otherwise.
Displaced homemaker = 1 if displaced homemaker, 0 otherwise.
Veteran = 1 if veteran of any war, 0 otherwise.
Vietnam veteran = 1 if veteran of Vietnam War, 0 otherwise.
Limited work history = 1 if limited work history, 0 otherwise.
Transportation = 1 if transportation is a barrier, 0 otherwise.
Basic skills defi ciency = 1 if basic skills defi ciency, 0 otherwise.
Child care = 1 if child care is a barrier, 0 otherwise.
Medical problem = 1 if medical problem, 0 otherwise.
Welfare recipient = 1 if receiving any public assistance (AFDC, food stamps, 
or general assistance), 0 otherwise.
Handicapped = 1 if physically handicapped, 0 otherwise.
Limited English profi ciency = 1 if tested and found to have limited ability to 
speak English, 0 otherwise.
Ex-offender = 1 if convicted of criminal offense prior to time of application, 
0 otherwise.
Substance abuse problem = 1 if determined by intake staff or medical doctor to 
be chemically dependent (i.e., a substance abuser), 0 otherwise.
Marital Status Variables
Never married = 1 if never married, 0 otherwise.
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise.
Married, not living with spouse = 1 if married, not living with spouse, 0 
otherwise.
Divorced = 1 if separated, divorced, or widowed, 0 otherwise.
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Family Composition
Number of children: (continuous, range 0–7).
Household size: (continuous variable).
Training History Variable
Previous training services = 1 if any vocational, occupational, or on-the-job 
training services were received by program applicant prior to his/her appli-
cation to JTPA, 0 otherwise.
Program Year Indicator Variables
Program year 1985 through Program year 1993: Each of these indicators takes 
on the value 1 if the JTPA participant was enrolled during that program year 
(beginning July 1, ending June 30), 0 otherwise.
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